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I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL 
FIGURED OUT 
Bradley Scott Shannon† 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, both of which deal with federal civil 
pleading standards, are important, but misunderstood. This Article 
hopes to alleviate some of the confusion and place these decisions in 
proper perspective. Viewed in terms of the two primary ways in which 
an action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted—factual insufficiency and legal insufficiency—
coupled with an understanding of a plaintiff’s obligations under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, these decisions arguably have 
resulted in little practical change in the overall federal pleading 
scheme. What these decisions have done, though, is brought renewed 
attention to the requirement that a plaintiff’s allegations be supported 
by evidence, and the problems that accompany such a requirement. 
But this Article argues that concerns regarding a plaintiff’s 
insufficiency of proof should be resolved not through Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 and the requirement that a plaintiff “show” that it 
is entitled to relief—as the Supreme Court appears to have done—but 
rather through Rule 11. This Article also argues that a federal-court 
action dismissed for failure to state a claim because of insufficiency 
of proof should not be given claim-preclusive effect in those state 
courts with less stringent pleading standards. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
† Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I thank Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., who, 
though not necessarily agreeing with the substance of this Article, was kind enough to provide 
extensive comments. I also thank the Case Western Reserve Law Review staff for their fine 
editing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 are probably the most significant 
civil procedure rulings in decades.3 Remarkably, though, for all of 
their significance, there remains widespread confusion as to what 
these decisions mean.4 The reaction to these decisions is also 
remarkable, for despite broad disagreement as to the meaning of 
Twombly and Iqbal, the consensus (at least within the legal academy) 
has been negative.5 In particular, many have accused the Court of 
reinterpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) and 
thereby effecting a significant change in federal civil pleading 
practice,6 a change that generally works to the disadvantage of 
plaintiffs.7 
                                                                                                                 
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
3 See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 
(2010) (“Twombly has been so influential that it is already among the most frequently cited 
Supreme Court decisions of all time.”).  
4 See, e.g., Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) 
(“Because Twombly is so widely cited, it is particularly unfortunate that no one quite 
understands what the case holds.”). 
5 See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
473, 476 (2010) (“Scholars have been largely critical of [Twombly].”). 
6 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (“The Court has revolutionized the law on 
pleading . . . [and] destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”). 
7 See, e.g., Comment, The Supreme Court 2008 Term: Leading Cases—Federal 
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 123 HARV. L. REV. 252, 253 (2009) (“[The Twombly/Iqbal] 
standard will likely constitute a substantial hurdle to most types of litigation.”). 
Incidentally, though the concerns associated with Twombly and Iqbal impact not just 
plaintiffs, but claiming parties generally, I use the shorthand term “plaintiff” throughout this 
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The primary purpose of this Article is twofold. First, the Article 
attempts to ease the confusion in this area by explaining the meaning 
of Twombly and Iqbal and identifying their place in the broader 
procedural context. Second, this Article attempts to show that some of 
the criticism directed toward these decisions might be unfounded. In 
its attempt to achieve this purpose, this Article will reach a number of 
conclusions, many of which run counter to the conventional thinking 
on this subject: 
1. The Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal probably 
did not result in a significant change in the overall federal-court 
pleading scheme. Rather, these decisions have brought increased 
attention to a plaintiff’s obligations in the pleadings stage and have 
invigorated the use of the motion to dismiss for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted,”8 much as the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,9 Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc.,10 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp.11 invigorated summary-judgment practice.12 
2. The word “plausible” as used by the Supreme Court in 
connection with a plaintiff’s allegations cannot be construed as 
meaning “believable.” Rather, it must refer only to the factual 
sufficiency of a complaint. This means that a factually suspicious (or 
even frivolous), but otherwise factually and legally sufficient, 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
3. The venerable passage from Conley v. Gibson13 that was 
“retired” by the Court in Twombly14—“that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief”15—appears to be dicta, and in any 
event related not to the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations, 
but rather to the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Article, both for clarity and because plaintiffs are probably the most impacted by these 
decisions. For similar reasons, this Article uses “defendant,” rather than “defending party,” to 
refer to those parties responding to a claiming party’s claims. 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
9 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
10 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
11 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
12 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing the federal standard for summary 
judgment). 
13 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
14 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (observing that the oft-
quoted “no set of facts” language in Conley consistently fails to “be understood in light of the 
opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the [Conley] Court 
quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief” ). 
15 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
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4. Though there are currently several proposals to abrogate the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Twombly and Iqbal, all are probably 
futile unless they also alter a plaintiff’s obligations under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In other words, the problem for plaintiffs 
brought to the fore by Twombly and Iqbal does not relate to the 
Court’s plausibility standard per se. Rather, the problem—if there is a 
problem—lies in the requirement that a plaintiff’s factual allegations 
(or “contentions”) “have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,”16 coupled with the 
limited ability to engage in formal discovery before the 
commencement of the action. 
5. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the current federal 
pleading scheme and the fact that it might differ from the practice in 
some states, the federal scheme, if properly understood and applied, 
does not unreasonably interfere with a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment,17 and raises no choice-of-law issue 
under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.18 Still, an argument can be 
made that dismissals for failure to state a claim due to a failure to 
comply with more stringent federal pleading requirements should not 
be given claim preclusive effect in state courts with less stringent 
requirements.  
This Article contains a brief and general discussion of the more 
significant rules governing federal pleading. It then attempts to 
explain the applicable standard in terms of the three ways in which a 
complaint properly may be dismissed for failure to state a claim: 
factual insufficiency, legal insufficiency, and insufficiency of proof. 
The Article then addresses two particularly troublesome and recurring 
problems: the proper disposition of the frivolous complaint, and the 
possible disparity between federal and state pleading requirements. 
But contrary to its title, the goal of this Article is not to show that its 
author indeed has federal pleading all figured out.19 Rather, the goal is 
to reach a broader understanding of federal pleading practice, an 
understanding that hopefully will lead to a more informed normative 
debate as to where the line for pleading sufficiency should be drawn 
and how that line might be moved, if desirable. 
                                                                                                                 
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
17 U.S. Const. amend. VII.  
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
19 Actually, the title of this Article, which was written mostly because everyone else 
teaching civil procedure was writing on this subject, is this author’s idea of humor. And not to 
be presumptuous, but the author actually looks forward to the almost inevitable response, “No 
you don’t!” 
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II. PLEADING FUNDAMENTALS AND GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL 
Federal pleading, like federal procedure generally, is governed 
primarily by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the rules 
related to pleading are sparse and, to a large extent, vague.  
With respect to stating a claim, the primary rule is Rule 8(a), 
which provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain: . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”20 Rule 8 also provides: “[e]ach 
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”;21 “[n]o technical form 
is required”;22 and “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do 
justice.”23 But though the Rules further provide that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, if timely 
raised by a defendant,24 results in the dismissal of that claim,25 the 
Rules give no further guidance as to precisely how or why a claim 
may be considered insufficient. 
A review of relevant case law, though, reveals essentially three 
ways in which an action properly may be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim—i.e., three different types of problems or defects that can 
render a complaint insufficient as a matter of law. This Article will 
                                                                                                                 
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) also requires “a short and plain statement of the 
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a demand for the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a)(1), (3). But the jurisdictional statement usually relates more to, well, jurisdiction than it 
does to stating a claim per se. For the latest word from the Supreme Court as to the meaning of 
“jurisdiction” in this context and how it differs from claim-processing rules, see Reed Elsevier, 
Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). Similarly, the statement of the relief requested relates 
primarily to other matters, and, in any event, any deficiencies in this regard are rarely 
significant. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) (“A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or 
exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings. Every other final judgment should grant 
the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its 
pleadings.”).  
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). 
22 Id. 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed 
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”) 
24 Though the defense of failure to state a claim is typically raised in a preanswer motion 
to dismiss, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), it may be raised in the answer, by a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, a motion for summary judgment, or even at trial, see FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(h)(2). But if the defense is not raised before the conclusion of the trial, it is waived. See 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006) (“[Defendant’s] failure to speak to the 
issue prior to the conclusion of the trial on the merits would preclude vacation of 
the . . . judgment . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing a means to dispose of a claim even though 
“dismissal” is not found in the text of the rule). Actually, it would be more accurate to say that 
the successful assertion of this defense results in the disposition of that claim, for it results in a 
dismissal only if asserted through a motion to dismiss. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an 
Action Is an Action Is an Action, 77 WASH. L. REV. 65, 116–46 (2002) (explaining that “dismissal” 
has a much narrower definition under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than its common usage). 
Overwhelmingly, though, the motion to dismiss is the means by which this defense is asserted.  
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refer to these three problems as factual insufficiency, legal 
insufficiency, and insufficiency of proof.26 By investigating what 
makes a complaint insufficient, perhaps one can reach some 
understanding as to what makes a complaint sufficient and, more 
importantly, where to draw the line.27  
A. Factual Insufficiency 
In order to understand what must be included in a complaint, one 
should reexamine the text of Rule 8(a).28 Rule 8(a) provides that a 
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”29 What, exactly, does 
this mean? In legal parlance, to “show” generally means to prove.30 
But what does the rest of this rule require? 
At least one thing is clear: whatever Rule 8(a) might require by 
way of a “showing,” it need not—indeed, it must not—be long and 
complicated. For the rule expressly provides that a plaintiff’s 
statement of the claim, whatever else it is, must be “short and plain.” 
Thus, whether one considers the Official Forms governing 
complaints31 or the Supreme Court’s repeated rebuffs to calls for 
                                                                                                                 
26 One could use different terminology here, and could even divide up this area in a 
completely different manner. For example, Allan Ides has argued that in order to state a valid 
claim under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must have what he calls “transactional sufficiency,” 
“procedural sufficiency,” and “substantive sufficiency.” Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the 
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a 
Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 FED. RULES DECISIONS 604, 606–14 
(2007). Moreover, this Article makes no claim that every pleading problem falls neatly into one 
(and only one) of these three categories. Nonetheless, these categories at least provide a starting 
point for discussion. 
27 Some have argued—perhaps correctly—that the standard for sufficiency under Rule 8 
is not the same as the standard for insufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6), and that a complaint might 
be found sufficient for purposes of the former but not the latter. See, e.g., Kirksey v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Where the plaintiff has gone 
astray is in supposing that a complaint which complies with Rule 8(a)(2) is immune from a 
motion to dismiss. This confuses form with substance. Rule 8(a)(2) specifies the conditions of 
the formal adequacy of the pleading. It does not specify the conditions of its substantive 
adequacy, that is, its legal merit.”). But following Twombly and Iqbal, the current practice seems 
to be to challenge even the marginal complaint and, for the sake of clarity, this Article will 
assume that the standards are the same for both. Accordingly, the focus of this Article will be on 
those allegations that must be included in a complaint to enable it to withstand a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
28 Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“The task of 
resolving the dispute over the meaning of [this statute] begins where all such inquiries must 
begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
30 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “show” as meaning: “To 
make (facts, etc.) apparent or clear by evidence; to prove.”). 
31 See FED. R. CIV. P. Forms 10–21. Though the Official Forms following the Rules 
“suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate,” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 84, they have historically been mostly ignored by practitioners. But renewed 
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heightened pleading outside of the context of Rule 9,32 the message is 
always the same: very little is required in order for a complaint to 
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.33 Indeed, in 
Twombly, the Court went out of its way to make it clear that this was 
still true.34 
But how little? Is it possible for a complaint to be too short and 
plain? Yes. And the reason (again) is that Rule 8(a) also requires a 
showing that the plaintiff is “entitled to relief.” What does this mean? 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the complaint must 
“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”35 Thus, showing that one is entitled to 
relief is about notice, though not simply notice that an action has been 
commenced against the defendant, for that the summons 
accomplishes.36 Rather, Rule 8(a) (again) requires that the plaintiff 
give notice as to the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which 
the claim rests. And why? Viewing the pleading rules as a whole, one 
reason—perhaps the primary reason—appears to be to enable the 
defendant to properly respond to the complaint—i.e., to give the 
defendant a reasonable opportunity not only to admit or deny the 
                                                                                                                 
 
interest in Form 11 has been generated as a result of its discussion in Twombly (at which time it 
was designated as Form 9). See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) 
(contrasting the adequacy of Form 9 with the inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ complaint in that 
case). 
32 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (“Rule 8(a)’s 
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions. Rule 9(b), for 
example, provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or mistake. This Court, 
however, has declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts.” (footnote omitted)); 
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 
(1993) (“We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ . . . with the 
liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”). 
33 Remarkably, though, despite the clarity of this language, many (if not most) federal-
court complaints are not entirely plain, and the vast majority are no where near short.  
34 See 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (“In reaching [the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ complaint was 
insufficient], we do not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the 
scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished ‘by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 
U.S. at 515)); id. at 570 (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). 
35 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). One might observe that although the Court 
might be correct from an interpretive perspective—after all, the Court is also the author of the 
Rules, at least in theory—Rule 8(a)(2) mentions neither “notice” nor “grounds.” Some have 
been confused on this point. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 4, at 856 (“Seizing on the word 
‘grounds’ in Rule 8, the Court held that ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his 
“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555)).  
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(E) (requiring that the summons “notify the defendant that a 
failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment against the defendant for the relief 
demanded in the complaint”). 
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plaintiff’s allegations,37 but also to allege any merits-based 
affirmative defenses (including failure to state a claim),38 compulsory 
counterclaims,39 and third-party claims.40 Another, related reason is to 
give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to assert any preanswer 
motions to dismiss.41 In particular, the plaintiff’s complaint should 
provide enough information to enable the defendant to identify those 
actions that may be eliminated at the pleading stage.42 Thus, though 
the line might be difficult to draw, virtually everyone agrees that “fair 
notice” requires at least some level of detail as to the nature of the 
plaintiff’s claims.  
As a result, there is no doubt that a statement of a claim that 
consists only of an allegation that the defendant is liable to the 
plaintiff and provides no information beyond the request for relief, 
would be considered insufficient.43 But what if a plaintiff alleged a bit 
                                                                                                                 
37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must . . . admit or 
deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”). Of course, it is not as though a 
defendant would be unable to respond even to the most general complaint, at least in a sense. 
For example, if a plaintiff were to allege only that “you are liable to me in an amount to be 
determined at trial,” a defendant probably would be entitled to respond with a general denial. 
But such a response might well be false, at least in part, and would do nothing to remove factual 
contentions from consideration at trial. 
38 See id. (“In responding to a pleading, a party must . . . state in short and plain terms its 
defenses to each claim asserted against it . . . .”).  
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1) (“A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—
at the time of its service—the [defendant] has against [the plaintiff] if the claim: (A) arises out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the [plaintiff]’s claim . . . .”). 
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a 
summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to [the defendant] for all or part 
of the [plaintiff’s] claim against [the defendant]”). Of course, some might argue that any 
problems caused by a lack of detail in a complaint eventually could be resolved by amending 
the answer. But though this might be true to some extent, it seems that the primary purpose of 
permitting a defendant to amend its answer cannot be to deal with matters that could have been 
pleaded by the plaintiff at commencement, but were not. Moreover, there are other possible 
reasons for providing notice of the grounds upon which one’s claim rests, including the need to 
ascertain the preclusive reach of any adjudication on the merits and to enable the defendant to 
determine whether it is entitled to a trial by jury. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 
IOWA L. REV. 272, 273 (1942) (“[Pleadings] must sufficiently differentiate the situation of fact 
which is being litigated from all other situations to allow application of the doctrine of res 
judicata, whereby final adjudication of this particular case will end the controversy forever. As 
a natural corollary, they will also show the type of case, so that it may be assigned to the proper 
form of trial . . . .”). 
41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (describing seven defenses that may be asserted through a 
preanswer motion to dismiss, including failure to state a claim). 
42 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (“[W]hen the allegations in a 
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency 
should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties 
and the court.’” (omission in original) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 234 (3d. ed. 2004))). 
43 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 
8 . . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). 
There might be some disagreement, though, as to the proper means of dealing with such a 
complaint. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
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more? For example, what if a plaintiff also alleged that the defendant 
was negligent, or (to recall Twombly), that the defendant violated 
federal antitrust law? Such an allegation would provide more 
information, but most would still consider it insufficient.44 And the 
reason, again, is that this allegation does not sufficiently show that 
this particular plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested of this 
particular defendant. And if the mere naming of a recognized cause 
of action is insufficient, then surely the mere recitation of the 
elements of such a cause of action also would be insufficient.45 
So what more is needed? It appears that facts are the answer46 
though the Rules—quite intentionally—fail to mention the word 
“facts,” and there is ultimately no meaningful distinction between 
facts and law.47 But what sort of facts? It would not seem 
unreasonable to require a plaintiff to plead enough facts to prove each 
element of at least one recognized cause of action.48 After all, the 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is part of the same 
procedural continuum as motions for summary judgment and for 
                                                                                                                 
44 It might be observed that such a “claim” would not be rendered insufficient because 
such causes of action do not exist, for they do. This is not to say, though, that the nonexistence 
of any particular cause of action cannot create a ground for the dismissal of an action; it can. But 
that is a different problem than the problem being discussed here, and is the subject of a later 
discussion. See infra Part II.B. 
45 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555)); id. (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 
46 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it 
is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 
the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”); see also Clark, supra 
note 40, at 278 (“The notice in mind is . . . that of the general nature of the case and the 
circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or events, 
to inform the opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated . . . and to tell the court of the 
broad outlines of the case . . . .”). As will be seen, though, nonconclusory (as opposed to factual) 
allegations might be more accurate; understanding that the distinction between nonconclusory 
and conclusory is no clearer than the distinction between fact and law.  
47 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003) (explaining why law and fact are not two distinct categories). 
48 Though this does not appear to be the standard that the Court has adopted—indeed, as 
will be explained, it appears that the Court has adopted a less-stringent standard—it does appear 
that a firm understanding of the elements of a recognized cause of action is the starting point. 
See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947 (“[W]e begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination . . . .”). And whether one likes this 
standard or not, this approach would be sufficient. See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1298 (“As 
long as a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations for every element of a claim for relief, it 
passes muster regardless of whether the judge might label the allegations implausible.”); see 
also 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.04[1][c], at 8-37 (3d ed. 
1997) (“Because a complaint may be attacked on plausibility grounds if there is no factual 
support for a crucial element of a claim, what the rule is, in the abstract, as to whether a pleader 
must state facts as to every element that is a part of the claim is irrelevant. Failure to do so may 
render a complaint subject to attack for failing to plead a ‘plausible’ claim.”). 
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judgment as a matter of law, meaning (in theory) that the standard for 
each should be essentially the same, with the primary difference being 
the nature of the “facts” being considered. Thus, whether the “facts” 
at issue appear in the form of allegations (as they would under Rule 
12(b)(6)), “paper” evidence—e.g., affidavits and certain discovery 
responses—(as they would under Rule 56), or evidence admitted at 
trial (as they would under Rule 50), the question at each juncture 
seemingly should be whether a reasonable juror could find in favor of 
the plaintiff.49 Such a standard also would not seem to be particularly 
onerous, in that the district court is required to assume that all of the 
plaintiff’s factual (or nonconclusory) allegations are true.50  
In any event, and regardless of what the Supreme Court might 
have meant in Twombly and Iqbal, this is not quite what it said. 
Instead, the Court said that a plaintiff’s claim must be “plausible.”51 
Whatever this term means52—and that has been the subject of 
considerable debate53—it cannot mean that a plaintiff’s allegations 
must be believable, for (again) a plaintiff’s allegations must be 
believed.54 That is not what factual sufficiency is about (or supposed 
to be about). Rather: “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
                                                                                                                 
49 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–52 (1986) (describing the 
relevant standard at summary judgment in these terms and essentially equating it to the 
judgment as a matter of law standard at trial). 
50 See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (observing that, except for legal conclusions, “a court 
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint”). 
51 See id. (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
52 Cf. McMahon, supra note 4, at 864 (“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not include 
a definition of ‘plausible’ in the Twombly decision.”).  
53 For example, Professor Ides argues that a complaint must have transactional 
sufficiency, meaning it “[m]ust be premised on a factual transaction and not simply on an 
abstract invocation of the law”; procedural sufficiency, meaning it “[m]ust describe the factual 
transaction with sufficient clarity to give the opposing party ‘fair notice’ of the underlying event 
and of the nature of the claim arising out of that event”; and substantive sufficiency, meaning it 
“[m]ust allege facts sufficient to show that the pleader is entitled to relief, which is to say that 
the pleading must state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Ides, supra note 26, at 607. 
There are several other and sometimes conflicting approaches, but the resolution of these 
various approaches is beyond the scope of this Article. 
54 This point, though well established, can hardly be emphasized enough, and will be 
discussed again in Part III.A. It is true that the Court has held that conclusory allegations are not 
entitled to this presumption, see, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, and one can fairly debate 
whether any particular allegation is conclusory or not (and perhaps the Court’s own analysis has 
not been entirely clear in this regard). But even the Iqbal Court made it quite plain: “[i]t is the 
conclusory nature of [a plaintiff’s] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, 
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.” Id. at 1951; accord Hartnett, supra note 5, at 
483 (“[N]o Justice interprets Twombly to empower a judge to disregard factual allegations 
simply because the judge finds them implausible.”).  
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alleged.”55 Thus, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”56 
So why did the Supreme Court find the Twombly and Iqbal 
complaints deficient? It was not because they were too short; to the 
contrary, in both cases, the complaints were quite long, and much 
longer (for example) than that set forth in Official Form 11. It was 
also not because the plaintiffs included conclusory allegations in their 
complaints, for that seems almost unavoidable (and such appear to be 
included in Form 11 as well). Instead, the problem was that they did 
not contain sufficient nonconclusory (and nonneutral) allegations 
indicative of liability.57 Essentially, the plaintiffs in both cases failed 
to allege sufficient specific facts in support of an element of their 
respective causes of action (or, more precisely, sufficient 
nonconclusory allegations to “permit the court to infer more than the 
mere possibility of misconduct”58). And because their claims were 
factually insufficient, they were subject to dismissal for failure to state 
a claim.  
Is the Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” standard the proper standard 
by which to assess the sufficiency of a complaint for the purpose of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim? Though most have 
argued “no,” the answer does not seem quite so clear. On the one 
hand, the standard imposed in these cases does seem to be higher than 
that imposed previously, at least in the minds of most lawyers. On the 
other hand, the current standard does not necessarily seem to 
represent an incorrect (or even inferior) interpretation of rule text, 
                                                                                                                 
55 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Again, this standard seems 
to require less than what is demanded of a plaintiff at summary judgment or at trial. See id. 
(“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)); 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is 
very remote and unlikely.’” (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))).  
56 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; accord id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Under Twombly, 
the relevant question is whether, assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has stated 
a ground for relief that is plausible.”). Of course, as with the distinction between conclusory and 
nonconclusory, see supra text accompanying note 46, the distinction between possible and 
plausible is not entirely clear. And as Iqbal itself seems to demonstrate, reasonable jurists might 
disagree as to the sufficiency of any particular complaint (even assuming agreement as to the 
appropriate standard).  
57 See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“While legal conclusions can provide the 
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). One must 
acknowledge the possibility, though, that the Court in those cases might have failed to properly 
apply its own analysis, an analysis that was largely unaided by prior lower-court determinations 
(understanding that it also might be impossible to separate completely abstract statements of the 
law from legal analysis).  
58 Id.  
 2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM 
464 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
particularly when considering the federal pleading scheme as a 
whole.59 But regardless of how this debate regarding the normative 
propriety of the Court’s “plausibility” standard is resolved—and that 
is decidedly not the purpose of this Article60—one might keep in 
mind that if factual insufficiency truly is the problem with a plaintiff’s 
complaint, then there is not much of a problem, at least not in most 
cases. This is because factual insufficiency is usually easily cured, 
given the extremely liberal standard for amending complaints.61 Only 
if, after being given a reasonable opportunity to amend, a plaintiff is 
unwilling or unable to cure the deficiency may an action be dismissed 
on this ground.62 This means—and this is important—that dismissals 
on this basis should be exceedingly rare. Thus, though considerable 
time and energy has been devoted to ascertaining precisely what is or 
is not plausible, in the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff should be 
able to satisfy almost any pleading standard that a district court might 
reasonably impose.63 In cases like Twombly (and perhaps Iqbal), then, 
                                                                                                                 
59 That said, to the extent the standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal differs from what 
the Court held previously, the Court probably should have explained why, after seventy years, 
its current understanding as to the meaning of Rule 8 is superior. Along this line, the Court’s 
attempt in Twombly to justify its interpretation—seemingly after the fact—based on the high 
cost of discovery and the potential to extort a settlement, see 550 U.S. at 557–60, arguably falls 
short. Though these concerns might have some validity as a policy matter, the Court provides no 
evidence that they were behind the language used by the original drafters of the Rules. 
60 Some additional thoughts on this subject nonetheless will be offered later in this 
Article. See infra Part III.A. 
61 As recently amended, Rule 15(a)(1) provides:  
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: 
(A) 21 days after serving it, or 
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after 
service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 
12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1). This means, in essence, that a plaintiff is now given one free shot at 
amending its complaint should the defendant move to dismiss for failure to state a claim or 
include such a defense in its answer. And even if the plaintiff fails to meet the twenty-one-day 
deadline imposed by Rule 15(a)(1), it still may seek leave to amend from the district court, 
which the court “should freely give . . . when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). See 
also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (elucidating this standard). 
62 Some fail to recall, for example, that this possibility was raised at the conclusion of the 
Court’s opinion in Iqbal. See 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“The Court of Appeals should decide in the 
first instance whether to remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to amend 
his deficient complaint.”). 
63 Cf. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (“[I]t should not prove 
burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some 
indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”). Admittedly, 
there are some portions of Twombly and Iqbal that still might be cause for concern. For 
example, in Iqbal, the Court stated, “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.” 129 S. Ct. at 1950. This might be read as conferring 
considerable discretion on the courts in this context. Moreover, the Iqbal Court instructed that 
“a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, 
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. This 
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the more interesting (and more important) question is why the 
plaintiffs in those cases were unable to meet the Court’s plausibility 
standard.64  
One last thought relates to the proper means of attacking a 
factually insufficient complaint. A defendant, of course, need not do 
anything with respect to an insufficient complaint, and need not do 
anything at the pleading stage.65 But if a defendant does want to 
challenge the factual sufficiency of a complaint, what is the proper 
procedural course? Some have suggested that, rather than move to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant concerned with the 
sufficiency of a complaint instead should move for a more definite 
statement pursuant to Rule 12(e),66 and there is language in some 
Supreme Court opinions that might be read as suggesting this 
approach.67 But it should be acknowledged that not every pleading 
                                                                                                                 
 
presumes an ability to properly separate the conclusory from the nonconclusory, a somewhat 
dubious proposition. Finally, it is true that an unnecessarily high pleading standard, as well as an 
ambiguous pleading standard—both of which are more likely to result in a need to replead—
impose additional, unnecessary costs. But again, it is not the purpose of this Article to suggest 
precisely what the federal pleading standard should be. 
64 A few others have asked the same question. See, e.g., Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent 
Developments: A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 831 n.46 (2008) (“Because 
leave to amend is given liberally, the plaintiffs’ failure to cure this defect here is even more 
perplexing.”). Of course, the Twombly plaintiffs did amend their complaint before dismissal. See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (citing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint). So the key question 
(again) is why those plaintiffs were nonetheless unable to meet the Court’s standard. See infra 
Part II.C. 
65 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., Has The Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 95 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, 
David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) (“The 
architecture of Iqbal’s mischief . . . is clear. The foundation is the Court’s mistaken conflation 
of the question of the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which is tested under Rule 12(b)(6), with 
the question of its sufficiency to provide adequate notice to the defendant, which is tested under 
Rule 12(e).”). Rule 12(e) provides: 
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 
cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a 
responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed 
within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court 
may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). 
67 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (“Such simplified ‘notice 
pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial 
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and 
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”); see also Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 590 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The remedy for an allegation lacking sufficient 
specificity to provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite 
statement.” (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002))).  
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deficiency may be cured by a motion for a more definite statement. A 
motion for a more definite statement is “limited . . . to instances in 
which the challenged pleading ‘is so vague or ambiguous that a party 
cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.’”68 It is 
possible for a complaint to be sufficient for the purpose of framing a 
responsive pleading and yet fail to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. Each rule has its own office. Moreover, so long as a 
plaintiff, in order to state a claim, must show that it is entitled to 
relief, the failure to do so must constitute a failure to state a claim. 
There does not appear to be any requirement that a defendant move 
for a more definite statement, rather than a dismissal, with respect to a 
complaint that fails to state a claim. To the contrary, “[i]f the movant 
believes the opponent’s pleading does not state a claim for relief, the 
proper course is a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) even if the pleading is 
vague or ambiguous.”69 In other words, to argue that a motion for a 
more definite statement is the sole remedy for the factually 
insufficient complaint is to suggest that factual insufficiency can 
never result in a failure to state a claim, and that seems incorrect.70 
Finally, there is, to some extent, little practical difference between 
these procedures, in that the burden imposed on the plaintiff 
(amendment of the complaint), as well as the penalty for failure to 
adequately respond to the deficiency in question (dismissal of the 
action), are essentially the same.71 
                                                                                                                 
68 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, at 309 (quoting former Rule 12(e)); accord id. 
§ 1375, at 306 (“[T]he only legitimate purpose of a Rule 12(e) motion is to aid the movant in 
responding to an objectionable pleading.”); see also 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488, 
¶ 12.36[1], at 12-121 (“Rule 12(e)’s standard is plainly designed to strike at unintelligibility 
rather than lack of detail.”); id. at 12-122 (“[P]roper pleading under Rule 8 requires a pleading 
to contain allegations of each element of the claim. If it does not, and if the deficiency is not so 
material that the pleading should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is 
appropriate.”). 
69 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1237, at 309; accord id. (“[E]ven if the 
pleading is so sketchy that it cannot be construed to show a right to relief, the proper attack is by 
a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(e).”); see also id. at 311 (“Thus, the class of 
pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is quite small.”). 
Perhaps an analogy may be made to Rule 12(f) and the motion to strike. If a complaint 
were to contain “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(f), a motion to strike would be an appropriate procedure. But if such a complaint were also to 
be insufficient as a matter of law, there does not appear to be any reason why a defendant could 
not instead move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
70 It is somewhat unclear whether that is the view of Professor Burbank, see supra note 66 
and accompanying text, but again, such a view seems suspect, as the weight of authority is to 
the contrary. 
71 See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1356, at 371–72 (“[R]epeated refusals by 
the plaintiff to conform to the dictates of Rule 8 and Rule 10 as to the proper form or content of 
the pleading may result in a dismissal for failure to state a claim.”). 
Some have alternatively argued that in lieu of a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a 
plaintiff with a factually insufficient complaint might be ordered to reply to the defendant’s 
answer pursuant to Rule 7(a)(7). But there are problems with this argument as well. For one 
 2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM 
2011] I HAVE FEDERAL PLEADING ALL FIGURED OUT 467 
B. Legal Insufficiency 
The second way in which an action may be dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(6) is for legal insufficiency. A good example of legal 
insufficiency can be found in Judge Richard Posner’s opinion for the 
court in Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.72 In Kirksey, the 
plaintiff attempted to allege a personal-injury claim against two 
cigarette manufacturers.73 The defendants moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was either 
preempted by federal law or unrecognized under Illinois state law.74 
The plaintiff responded that Rule 8(a)(2) requires little in the way of 
facts, and nothing in the way of legal theories.75 Though the court of 
appeals essentially agreed, it held, in affirming the dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s action, that apparent compliance with Rule 8 was 
insufficient. 
This confuses form with substance. Rule 8(a)(2) specifies the 
conditions of the formal adequacy of a pleading. It does not 
specify the conditions of its substantive adequacy, that is, its 
legal merit. . . . 
It is true that a claim should not be dismissed out of hand just 
because it is so novel that it cannot be fitted into an existing 
legal category . . . . But a claim that does not fit into an 
existing legal category requires more argument by the 
plaintiff to stave off dismissal, not less, if the defendant 
moves to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim has 
no basis in law. The plaintiff has to show that while her claim 
has no basis in existing law, or at least the law’s current 
pigeonholes, it lies in the natural line of the law’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
thing, “[a] clear showing of necessity or of extraordinary circumstances of a compelling nature 
will usually be required before the court will order a reply.” 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488, 
¶ 7.02[7][b], at 7-12. A deficient complaint does not seem to be the sort of “necessity” 
contemplated under this procedure, given that there is already a different procedure for dealing 
with that problem. Perhaps more importantly, a reply presupposes an answer, and it is precisely 
to avoid preparing an answer that a defendant asserts the defense of failure to state a claim in a 
preanswer motion. Finally, as with the use of Rule 12(e), it does not appear that the use of a 
reply in this context would accomplish anything that could not be accomplished by a motion to 
dismiss. 
72 168 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1999). 
73 Id. at 1040. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1040–41. 
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development and should now be recognized as a part of the 
law.76 
Thus, in addition to factual sufficiency, a claim must be legally 
sufficient. Legal sufficiency is important because a plaintiff that fails 
to rely on any recognized legal theory cannot possibly win at trial or 
at any other stage in the proceedings.77 
It should now be apparent that the problem in both Twombly and 
Iqbal was not legal insufficiency. For in both cases, the plaintiffs 
attempted to plead recognized causes of action.78  
By contrast, the famous “no set of facts” passage from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson79 did relate to legal 
insufficiency.80 In Conley, the Court began: 
                                                                                                                 
76 Id. at 1041–42. 
77 As noted previously, see supra text accompanying note 27, the Kirksey court seemed to 
suggest that the standard for sufficiency under Rule 8 might be lower than that required under 
Rule 12(b)(6). But it is not at all clear that this is true, for it is difficult to see how the pleading 
of a legally insufficient claim shows that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. It is also difficult to see 
how a vague or ambiguous complaint could be found sufficient under Rule 8, for if it could, 
how could such a complaint be challenged under Rule 12(e)? It might well be, then, that the 
standard for sufficiency under Rule 8 is actually higher, not lower, than that required under Rule 
12(b)(6).  
78 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947–49 (2009) (describing “the elements a 
plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled 
to assert the defense of qualified immunity”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548 
(2007) (describing “[l]iability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1”). 
Professor Ides explains Twombly in somewhat different terms. He argues that the problem 
was one of substantive sufficiency, which “requires that the facts alleged comprise a claim on 
which relief can be granted, i.e., the factual allegations must be sufficient to show ‘that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ides, supra note 26, at 611 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
Professor Ides of course agrees that the plaintiffs in that case were at least trying to plead a 
claim based on a recognized cause of action. The problem was that the nonconclusory facts 
alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint did not adequately plead such a claim. See id. at 627 (“An 
‘agreement’ is a material element of a § 1 claim. Therefore, a sufficient outline or adumbration 
of a § 1 claim must include allegations supportive of that material element.”). Though this 
seems to be a correct appraisal, one might observe that “substantive” sufficiency, as he uses that 
phrase, seems to include a factual as well as a legal component—i.e., a complaint, in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss, must be based on a recognized cause of action and must include 
sufficient nonconclusory allegations. It seems useful, however, to distinguish the situation in 
Twombly from that in Kirksey, in which there was no such underlying cause of action. Thus 
(again), this Article argues that the problem in the former was factual insufficiency, whereas the 
problem in the latter was legal insufficiency.  
Having said this—and not to resurrect any sort of hard fact/law distinction—it does not 
seem particularly useful to recast what are essentially factual insufficiency problems in terms of 
legal insufficiency. For example, Professor Ides argues, “[i]n essence, [the Twombly plaintiffs] 
pled themselves out of court by filing a complaint that alleged a claim unrecognized by the 
Sherman Act, namely, a claim of anticompetitive parallel conduct.” Id. at 631. Though this is 
one way to view the world, it does not appear that this was the approach the plaintiffs in that 
case were trying to take, as it seems that the plaintiffs in that action knew that parallel conduct 
alone would not suffice at trial. Instead, it appears that they were hoping that discovery would 
provide whatever additional detail might have been missing from their complaint. 
79 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
80 Arguably, though, it was not a part of any holding by that Court, as many seem to 
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Once again Negro employees are here under the Railway 
Labor Act asking that their collective bargaining agent be 
compelled to represent them fairly. In a series of cases 
beginning with Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., this 
Court has emphatically and repeatedly ruled that an exclusive 
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated to 
represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and 
without discrimination because of race and has held that the 
courts have power to protect employees against such 
invidious discrimination.81 
When the Court finally addressed the failure-to-state-a-claim issue, it 
stated: 
under the general principles laid down in the Steele, Graham, 
and Howard cases the complaint adequately set forth a claim 
                                                                                                                 
 
believe. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL 
PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 295 (Kevin M. Clermont 2d ed., 2008) (describing this passage in 
that manner). In Conley, the defendants moved to dismiss on three grounds: “(1) the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy; (2) the Texas and 
New Orleans Railroad, which had not been joined, was an indispensible party defendant; and 
(3) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be given.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 
43. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the jurisdictional ground, id. at 43-44, 
and, presumably because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, “did not pass on 
the other reasons advanced for dismissal,” id. at 45. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
“apparently relying on the same ground,” affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id. at 44. 
The Supreme Court held that “it was error for the courts below to dismiss the complaint for lack 
of jurisdiction.” Id. But rather than remand for lower court consideration of the other grounds 
for dismissal, the Court found “it timely and proper . . . to consider them here.” Id. at 45. 
Whether the Supreme Court should have proceeded to express its view as to the 
indispensible-party and failure-to-state-a-claim issues is debatable. On the one hand, these other 
issues were “briefed and argued by both parties and the respondents urge[d] that the decision 
below be upheld, if necessary, on these other grounds.” Id. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court often considers it beneficial, and sometimes even demands, that issues first be considered 
by lower courts. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120–21 (1976) (“It is the general 
rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon 
below.”). Additionally, although (as indicated) the Court generally may affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals on any basis, in Conley, the Court did not affirm; it reversed. Be that as it 
may, there is little doubt that the Court’s discussion of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint was dicta, for it had nothing to do with the Court’s judgment, which, strictly 
speaking, related only to subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court’s discussion of the failure-to-
state-a-claim issue seemingly could not count even as an alternative holding, as, by itself, it was 
insufficient in that the Court could not have reversed on the basis of that issue alone. Though 
some might read this portion of the Court’s opinion as indicative of what the Court might hold 
in the future, and though later courts (perhaps even the Supreme Court) might have so held, 
what the Conley Court said as to this issue has no binding precedential value. For this reason 
alone, it is somewhat surprising that the Twombly Court (which never refers to this language as 
a holding and assiduously seems to avoid the term “overrule”) went to the trouble to “retire” this 
language. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (noting that Conley’s “no set of facts language” has 
“puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years” and “earned its retirement”). 
81 Conley, 355 U.S. at 42 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 2/15/2011 7:09:03 PM 
470 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
upon which relief could be granted. In appraising the 
sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted 
rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief. Here, the complaint alleged, in part, that 
petitioners were discharged wrongfully by the Railroad and 
that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect 
their jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them 
with their grievances all because they were Negroes. If these 
allegations are proven there has been a manifest breach of the 
Union’s statutory duty to represent fairly and without hostile 
discrimination all of the employees in the bargaining unit. 
This Court squarely held in Steele and subsequent cases that 
discrimination in representation because of race is prohibited 
by the Railway Labor Act. The bargaining representative’s 
duty not to draw “irrelevant and invidious” distinctions 
among those it represents does not come to an abrupt end, as 
the respondents seem to contend, with the making of an 
agreement between union and employer. Collective 
bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it 
involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other 
working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by 
existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights 
already secured by contract. The bargaining representative 
can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these 
functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. A 
contract may be fair and impartial on its face yet administered 
in such a way, with the active or tacit consent of the union, as 
to be flagrantly discriminatory against some members of the 
bargaining unit.82 
Only later in its opinion did the Conley Court discuss the problem at 
issue in Twombly and Iqbal: factual insufficiency. 
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set 
forth specific facts to support its general allegations of 
discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The 
decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the 
facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the 
                                                                                                                 
82 Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944)).  
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Rules require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” 
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative 
forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such 
simplified “notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal 
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures 
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis 
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the 
disputed facts and issues. Following the simple guide of Rule 
8(f) that “all pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice,” we have no doubt that petitioners’ 
complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the 
respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject 
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and 
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to 
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.83 
When properly viewed as relating to legal insufficiency,84 it is 
somewhat surprising that the Twombly Court decided to “retire” the 
Conley Court’s “no set of facts” language, for it does not seem to say 
anything controversial. It has long been—and presumably still is—the 
law that an action must not be dismissed if the facts alleged in the 
complaint would entitle the plaintiff to relief under some recognized 
legal theory, irrespective of whether any particular legal theory has 
been pleaded.85 The problem is that the Twombly Court—
                                                                                                                 
83 Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In contrast to the “no set of facts” 
language, this portion of the Conley opinion was quoted by the Twombly Court with approval. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
84 A few others have also made this observation. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 66, at 12 
(“[T]he Conley Court’s use of the ‘no set of facts’ language was intended to address only those 
situations in which, no matter how compelling the facts alleged, the law did not provide 
relief.”); Sherwin, supra note 80, at 315-16 (arguing that the way to make sense of the Conley 
opinion is to note that the “no set of facts” language “refers only to determining whether any 
legal claim could exist, not to testing how detailed its factual statement need be”). 
85 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 48, ¶ 8.04[3], at 8-40 (“Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a 
claimant to set forth any legal theory justifying the relief sought on the facts alleged, but does 
require sufficient factual averments to show that the claimant may be entitled to some relief.”). 
It seems, though, that at least some factual detail must be alleged in the complaint to enable a 
district court to reasonably decide this issue. In other words, just as a challenge to legal 
sufficiency “requires more argument by the plaintiff to stave off dismissal, not less,” Kirksey v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 1999), it also might require more in 
the way of factual allegations. See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488, ¶ 12.34[1][b], at 12-79 
(“[T]he pleading must at least set forth sufficient information for the court to determine whether 
some recognized legal theory exists on which relief could be accorded the pleader. If it fails to 
do so, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted.”). In this sense, the fact/law distinction 
again begins to blur somewhat, in that a plaintiff’s ability to plead a valid claim—i.e., one based 
on a recognized cause of action or legal theory—depends to some extent on the plaintiff’s 
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erroneously—read this passage as relating to factual insufficiency. As 
that Court stated: 
This “no set of facts” language can be read in isolation as 
saying that any statement revealing the theory of the claim 
will suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown 
from the face of the pleadings; and the Court of Appeals 
appears to have read Conley in some such way when 
formulating its understanding of the proper pleading standard. 
On such a focused and literal reading of Conley’s “no set of 
facts,” a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive 
a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the 
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some “set of 
[undisclosed] facts” to support recovery. So here, the Court of 
Appeals specifically found the prospect of unearthing direct 
evidence of conspiracy sufficient to preclude dismissal, even 
though the complaint does not set forth a single fact in a 
context that suggests an agreement. It seems fair to say that 
this approach to pleading would dispense with any showing 
of a “‘reasonably founded hope’” that a plaintiff would be 
able to make a case; Mr. Micawber’s optimism would be 
enough. 
Seeing this, a good many judges and commentators have 
balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a 
pleading standard. . . . 
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further 
citations to show that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has 
been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough. 
To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should be 
understood in light of the opinion’s preceding summary of the 
complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite 
reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief. But 
the passage so often quoted fails to mention this 
understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the 
                                                                                                                 
 
ability to marshal sufficient, relevant facts. Thus, it might be true that the federal rules 
governing legal sufficiency “are in general adequate because judgments on the validity of 
claims do not require any discovery.” Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How 
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 
61 (2007) (emphasis added). But there are probably a few cases in which discovery would lead 
to claims of which the plaintiff was previously unaware.  
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profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned 
its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim 
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing 
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the 
complaint. Conley, then, described the breadth of opportunity 
to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the 
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a 
complaint’s survival.86 
If this portion of Conley is read as applying to factual 
insufficiency, then the Twombly Court’s rejection of that language is 
surely correct. For it is also the law that a plaintiff cannot allege 
anything short of impossibility and have it suffice as a factual 
matter.87 A complaint can only be evaluated based on those 
allegations that are pleaded, not on what a plaintiff might some day 
prove, which cannot be known or predicted by the court or even the 
defendant. But (again), that is not the context in which this passage 
arises.88 
                                                                                                                 
86 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations 
omitted); see also id. at 553 (“Although the Court of Appeals took the view that plaintiffs must 
plead facts that ‘include conspiracy among the realm of “plausible” possibilities in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss,’ it then said that ‘to rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive 
conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude that there is 
no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism 
asserted was the product of collusion rather than coincidence.’” (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. 
Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005))). 
87 This also supplies part of the reason why the factual insufficiency of a complaint can 
serve as a basis for a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Many have described the futility of 
demanding greater particularity in pleadings and they are correct in that plaintiffs frequently do 
not have an entirely clear view of their cases at commencement and in that the admission of 
material allegations by defendants is rare. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 40, at 274 (discussing the 
difficulties lawyers have to confront when faced with a demand for greater specificity in 
pleadings). But such arguments also seem to presume that every complaint contains a legally 
sufficient claim and that presumption seems unwarranted. A plaintiff should not be able to hide 
a legally insufficient claim behind a factually insufficient statement of that claim. Such claims 
should be eliminated at the pleading stage, not at summary judgment.  
88 Similarly, the Twombly Court is undoubtedly also correct regarding the “breadth of 
opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims,” and the idea that “once a claim has 
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the 
allegations in the complaint.” 550 U.S. at 563. But contrary to the Twombly Court’s explanation, 
that is not at all what the Conley Court stated, let alone held. 
Incidentally, as the Twombly Court correctly observed that, a similar misreading (or 
overreading) of precedent appears to have occurred with respect to another venerable pleading 
decision: Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). The precise issue before the 
Swierkiewicz Court was “whether a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit must 
contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set 
forth by this Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508. The 
Court held that “an employment discrimination complaint need not include such facts and 
instead must contain only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
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If a complaint is found to be legally insufficient, is there anything 
that a plaintiff can do to avoid dismissal? Probably not, for unlike the 
factual insufficiency context, wherein the opportunity to amend 
potentially will save many deficient complaints, there seems to be 
little a plaintiff can do when the law fails to provide for the relief 
requested.89 One might try waiting as long as the applicable statute of 
limitation will allow for the law to change, or being judicious in one’s 
choice of forum if that would result in a different source of 
substantive law. But aside from that, a plaintiff seemingly has little 
                                                                                                                 
 
entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). In support of its holding, the Court 
observed, “it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case 
because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination 
case,” id. at 511, and because “the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary 
depending on the context,” id. at 512. Though the Court went on to state that the plaintiff’s 
complaint “easily satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a),” id. at 514, it is not at all clear that the 
Court’s analysis as to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint in the absence of any “prima 
facie case” requirement (an issue that does not appear to have been decided by any lower court 
in that case) may fairly be characterized as a holding. Id. Stated another way: if the issue before 
the Court is whether a complaint must include Y, and the Court decides that a complaint need 
not include Y, that would constitute a holding. If the Court were to go further and state that the 
reason why Y need not be included is that a complaint need only include X, that also seemingly 
would constitute a holding (particularly when X consists of little more than a recitation of the 
relevant procedural rule). But whether a statement by the Court that the complaint at issue 
actually included X properly could be regarded as a holding is far from clear. Indeed, given the 
precise nature of the defendant’s motion in that case, one could fairly conclude that the 
defendant had all but conceded sufficiency in all other respects. See SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a) (“Only 
the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the 
Court.”); cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 (1992) (“Petitioners suggest that the 
statutory procedure for changing the use of a mobile home park is in practice ‘a kind of 
gauntlet,’ in that they are not in fact free to change the use of their land. Because petitioners do 
not claim to have run that gauntlet, however, this case provides no occasion to consider how the 
procedure has been applied to petitioners’ property, and we accordingly confine ourselves to the 
face of the statute.”) (citations omitted).  
The same analysis appears to apply with respect to the Court’s reasoning in Leatherman v. 
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit. 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (“We 
granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may apply a ‘heightened pleading 
standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure—in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under Rev. Stat. 
§ 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold it may not.”).  
By contrast, in Twombly (as well as in Iqbal), the issue related to the precise nature of the 
appropriate pleading standard in the absence of any sort of heightened pleading requirement. 
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2009) (“This case . . . turns on a narrower 
question: Did respondent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual matter that, if taken 
as true, states a claim that petitioners deprived him of his clearly established constitutional 
rights.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553 (“We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for 
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”).  
Thus, contrary to the views of some of the Court’s critics, the Court’s explanation of the 
pleading standard demanded under Rule 8 and its attempt to distinguish that demanded under 
Rule 9 might not be entirely inconsistent with prior precedent. 
89 This presumes that one can distinguish the situation where a plaintiff might have a valid 
claim but has failed to sufficiently state it, from the situation where a plaintiff is unable to state 
a recognized claim because none exists. 
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choice but to somehow convince the district court that the cause of 
action underlying its claim, though novel, should be recognized.90 
C. Insufficiency of Proof 
The final way in which an action may be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim is insufficiency of proof.91 What does this mean in the 
context of pleading and the sufficiency of a complaint? 
There is a wonderful old case out of Utah found in Stephen 
Yeazell’s civil procedure textbook,92 Reid v. San Pedro, Los Angeles 
and Salt Lake Railroad Co.,93 that well illustrates the point. In Reid, a 
rancher was pasturing cattle on land adjacent to a railroad.94 The 
plaintiff alleged that a fence constructed by the railroad company to 
keep livestock off the tracks was “broken and in poor repair and 
become down so that cattle had an easy passage through [it].”95 At the 
same time, a gate that had been installed for the convenience of the 
landowner also had been left open.96 Tragically, “a three year old 
heifer of the plaintiff strayed on the right of way of said defendant 
company” and the railroad company’s train “ran on and over said 
heifer,” resulting in her untimely death.97 Under the prevailing law, if 
the heifer escaped through the fence, the railroad company was liable, 
whereas an escape through the gate was the rancher’s responsibility.98 
                                                                                                                 
90 See Kirksey, 168 F.3d at 1042 (speculating that the plaintiff’s lawyer’s problem in that 
case “is that he really cannot think of a viable legal basis for his client’s claim, that he hopes 
that the current legal ferment in the world of tobacco litigation will brew him up a theory at 
some future date if only he can stave off immediate dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)”).  
Of course, there might be any number of other, extrajudicial things that a plaintiff might 
do in this situation—for example, one might consider approaching a legislator—but those that 
do not involve the commencement of a civil action are beyond the scope of this Article. 
91 A qualification is in order here. Actually, it does not appear that insufficiency of proof 
is, per se, a ground for dismissal, at least not under Rule 12(b)(6). Strictly speaking, an action 
may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only for factual or legal insufficiency. See Epstein, 
supra note 85, at 61 (“The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be 
attacked either for its legal or factual sufficiency.”). Insufficiency of proof, though, might be a 
ground for dismissal under Rule 11. For a discussion of that issue, see infra Part III.A. As will 
be discussed, insufficiency of proof can lead to a dismissal for failure to state a claim only 
indirectly, in that it can prevent a plaintiff from alleging sufficient facts to survive a motion to 
dismiss, i.e., factual insufficiency. See supra Part II.A. But not all instances of factual 
insufficiency are caused by insufficiency of proof. For example, factual insufficiency also can 
result when a plaintiff is unaware of the proper pleading standard, or for some reason refuses to 
allege sufficient information. It therefore seems helpful conceptually to distinguish insufficiency 
of proof, particularly given its current importance. 
92 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 553 (7th ed. 2008). 
93 118 P. 1009 (Utah 1911). 
94 Id. at 1010. 
95 Id. at 1009. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. at 1010 (“Under this statute, if the cow entered upon the right of way through 
the open gate, [the railroad company] cannot be held liable for her loss; there being no evidence 
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A jury returned a verdict in favor of the rancher.99 The railroad 
company appealed on the ground that “the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict because it fails to show where and under what 
circumstances the cattle sued for got upon the right of way.”100 The 
Supreme Court of Utah agreed: 
There is no direct evidence as to where the cow got on to the 
right of way. It is conceded, however, that she was killed in 
the immediate vicinity of the gate mentioned, and, as shown 
by the evidence, about one mile from the point where the 
fence inclosing the right of way was down and out of repair. 
The inference, therefore, is just as strong, if not stronger, that 
she entered upon the right of way through the open gate as it 
is that she entered through the fence at the point where it was 
out of repair. . . . [T]he burden was on [the rancher] to 
establish the liability of the defendant by a preponderance of 
the evidence. It is a familiar rule that where the undisputed 
evidence of the plaintiff, from which the existence of an 
essential fact is sought to be inferred, points with equal force 
to two things, one of which renders the defendant liable and 
the other not, the plaintiff must fail. So in this case, in order 
to entitle respondent to recover, it was essential for her to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the cow 
entered upon the right of way through the broken down fence. 
This the respondent failed to do. 
We are of the opinion that the verdict rendered on the first 
cause of action is not supported by the evidence, and that the 
trial court should have directed a verdict for appellant on that 
cause of action in accordance with appellant’s request.101 
In modern terms, one might say that the evidence presented at trial 
provided no basis upon which a reasonable juror could find in favor 
of the rancher. Thus, one can only surmise that the verdict in favor of 
the rancher was based on speculation, or perhaps sympathy.102 
                                                                                                                 
 
of negligence on the part of trainmen at the time she was killed.”). 
99 See id. (“A trial was had which resulted in a verdict for [the rancher] on each of the four 
causes of action.”).  
100 Id. 
101 Id. It probably did not help the rancher’s case that by the time the case reached the 
supreme court, the heifer had become a mere “cow.” 
102 Of course, the Reid situation should be contrasted with the more typical situation at trial 
in which a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict (or today, at least in federal court, for 
judgment as a matter of law) must be denied despite the fact that the jury might well reject the 
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Though Reid involved the propriety of a jury verdict following the 
admission of evidence at trial, one might consider what the result 
might have been if the rancher had included similar allegations in her 
complaint, and the railroad company had moved to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim (assuming something akin to that procedure existed at 
that time and in that place). For example, what if the rancher had 
alleged that the heifer escaped either through the fence or the gate; 
that she had no evidence indicating whether the fence, as opposed to 
the gate, was the more likely exit, but that the railroad company was 
nonetheless liable for the heifer’s death?103 Should a motion to 
dismiss such an action be granted? 
It seems that the answer must be yes. And the reason, at least in a 
sense, is insufficiency of proof. For even assuming the allegations in 
the rancher’s complaint are true, the rancher cannot prevail, as the 
rancher has not shown that she is entitled to the relief requested—or, 
in the words of the Twombly and Iqbal Courts, that her claim is 
“‘plausible.’”104 The problem is not legal insufficiency, for even the 
railroad company conceded that it would be liable upon sufficient 
proof that the heifer escaped through the fence. The problem also is 
not factual insufficiency, at least not in the usual sense, for the 
rancher appears to have alleged as much in the way of nonconclusory 
facts as is found in any of the Official Form complaints. Rather, the 
problem lies in the fact that the rancher has no way of determining 
(and therefore no way of proving) how the heifer escaped, and cannot 
(truthfully) allege otherwise. She therefore would be unable to 
“nudge[]” her claim “across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”105 
                                                                                                                 
 
plaintiff’s evidence and find in favor of the defendant. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 564 n.8 (2007) (“[It is an] unobjectionable proposition that, when a complaint adequately 
states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff 
will fail to . . . prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.”). The difference is that, in 
the more typical situation, a reasonable juror could find in favor of the plaintiff, whereas in 
Reid, a reasonable juror could not.  
103 Actually, this is essentially what the rancher did allege. See Reid, 118 P. at 1009 
(stating in her complaint that she “does not know, and therefore is unable to state, whether the 
fence was down or the gate left open”). Even on appeal, the rancher argued that “[i]t is 
immaterial whether the heifer strayed on through an inviting open gate or an enticing open 
fence. . . .” Id. at 1010 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
105 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. One might say that Reid pleaded herself out of court, and 
that might be true in the sense that “the face of the complaint exposed the inadequacy of the 
claim.” Ides, supra note 26, at 632. But one alternatively could argue that Reid was never in 
court, in the sense that there was nothing she could remove from her complaint to cure the 
insufficiency. Rather, the problem was that she could not allege that the heifer more likely than 
not exited via the fence. 
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And this brings us back to Twombly. The principal problem for the 
plaintiffs in Twombly was the failure to allege an actual agreement by 
the defendants to restrain trade. But if that was the problem, why did 
the plaintiffs not seek leave to amend?106 The answer is somewhat 
uncertain, but presumably they were not aware of any actual 
agreement of this nature, meaning leave to amend would have been 
futile.107 And the reason it would have been futile was (and is) Rule 
11, and specifically, Rule 11(b)(3). Rule 11(b)(3) requires that the 
“factual contentions [alleged in a complaint] have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery.”108 What this means, essentially, is that, in order to 
successfully state a claim in federal court, a plaintiff generally must 
have the goods (so to speak) ab initio, upfront, at the commencement 
of the action.109 Thus (and contrary to what many seem to believe), 
                                                                                                                 
106 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing amendment as the typical 
solution to factual insufficiency). 
107 See Tice, supra note 64, at 831 (“Why did the plaintiffs not simply amend their 
complaint to allege [an] agreement [to conspire] directly . . . ? Barring attorney incompetence, 
the answer must be that the plaintiffs did not believe that such an amended pleading would have 
succeeded.” (footnote omitted)). 
108 FED R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (proscribing complaints 
“presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring claims to be “warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law 
or for establishing new law”). This does not mean that a plaintiff must plead evidence, whatever 
that phrase might mean. A plaintiff may attach and adopt by reference documents to a 
complaint, see FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c), and may verify its complaint, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) 
(“Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified . . . .”), 
but it is not required to do so. But this does not detract from the point that whatever is pleaded 
generally must have evidentiary support. 
Incidentally, this requirement probably supplies part of the reason why a plaintiff’s 
allegations are assumed to be true. For at the pleading stage, no one, aside from the plaintiff, 
knows the full nature or extent of the plaintiff’s evidence supporting its allegations; everyone 
else simply is required to assume that it exists. This stands in sharp contrast to the procedure at 
summary judgment and at trial, where a plaintiff’s allegations (except to the extent admitted by 
the defendant) are essentially disregarded, and the focus turns to “paper” evidence (in the case 
of summary judgment) or actual, admitted evidence (in the case of judgment as a matter of law). 
109 Of course, Rule 11(b)(3) alternatively permits a plaintiff to allege that it is “likely” that 
its allegations will have evidentiary support after further investigation or discovery, a provision 
that was designed to provide some relief for plaintiffs that lack sufficient evidence at 
commencement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Regrettably, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff will, 
on the one hand, lack sufficient evidentiary support for its allegations, and yet, on the other 
hand, be able certify that it is “likely” it will be able to obtain such support at some point in the 
future. As Carl Tobias explains: 
[Rule 11’s] “duty of candor,” requiring litigants who make assertions that may lack 
evidentiary support to identify specifically that possibility, can be very burdensome, particularly 
for parties with limited access to information involving their allegations or few resources for 
gathering, assessing, and synthesizing that material which is accessible. When pertinent 
information is in the defendants’ minds or files, for example, plaintiffs will encounter great 
difficulty in specifically delineating contentions which are likely to be substantiated after 
reasonable opportunity for additional investigation or discovery, before they have had that 
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one may not allege facts based solely on wishful thinking, and on 
what one hopes to obtain during discovery.110 Rather, a claim that is 
lacking in evidentiary support is a claim that simply may not be 
pleaded, at least not properly.111 Perhaps this has not always been the 
standard, but this has been the law in the federal courts since at least 
1993, the year this portion of Rule 11 was amended to read as it does 
today, if not 1983, the year this rule was given its current “bite.”112 
                                                                                                                 
 
opportunity. Even if the plaintiffs do not participate in unalloyed speculation, they would still 
experience problems designating those allegations which probably will have support, identifying 
them with sufficient particularity, and ascertaining what is a reasonable opportunity. 
Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 203 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted). As a result, such allegations are probably rare (and again, would have to be 
specifically so identified). 
110 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and 
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not 
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). 
111 Of course, a lack of evidentiary support for an element of a plaintiff’s claim will 
probably also prevent that plaintiff from pleading nonconclusory allegations relating to that 
element. But for reasons to be developed, it appears that the bigger problem for plaintiffs in this 
situation is not (or should not be) the standard for pleading per se, but rather Rule 11. 
112 See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 
§ 2(A), at 1-5 (4th ed. 2008) (“Although [Rule 11] was originally adopted in 1938, it had no real 
bite for 45 years, until August 1983.”). Originally, Rule 11 provided in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and 
that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the 
purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though 
the pleading had not been served. 
Id. § 4(A), at 2-5 to -6. In 1983, the “good ground to support” language was stricken and 
in its place the plaintiff (or its attorney) was required to certify:  
[T]hat to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. 
Id., at 2-5. The most recent significant amendment to Rule 11 occurred in 1993. This 
eliminated the “well grounded in fact” language in favor of what became Rule 11(b)(3): “[T]he 
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery.” Id., at 2-3. Though the “allegations” portion of this passage was 
later eliminated as redundant, see id., at 2-1 (“[T]he factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery”), this is essentially how the rule reads today.  
Whether the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 resulted in a significant change in pleading 
standards is unclear. The 1983, “well grounded in fact” standard “was satisfied if a reasonable 
person in the signer’s position would have believed the factual allegations to be true.” Id. 
§ 2(A)(1), at 1-9. On the other hand, “the use of the words ‘evidence’ and ‘evidentiary support’” 
in the current version of Rule 11 “impart the notion of admissibility—i.e., that admissible 
evidence will be forthcoming at least at some point in the pretrial process.” Id. § 2(A)(4), at  
1-33. Regardless, there is no question but that pleading standards changed somewhat 
dramatically (if indirectly) following the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.  
Thus, for those who argue that the Twombly and Iqbal Courts are not interpreting the law 
of pleading as it used to be interpreted, one might fairly ask, to which era are they speaking? If 
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Thus, for plaintiffs that lack the evidence they need to “show” that 
they are entitled to the relief requested (and cannot show that they are 
likely to obtain such evidence later), the importance of Rule 11(b)(3) 
probably cannot be overstated.113 With respect to federal pleading, it 
is the proverbial elephant in the (court)room. 
And there is one more piece to the puzzle. Why did the plaintiffs 
in Twombly lack evidentiary support for their claim, to the point 
where they were unable to plead such a claim consistent with Rule 
11? The answer might be that such evidence simply does not exist, 
and undoubtedly that is true in many cases in which the plaintiff is 
                                                                                                                 
 
they are speaking of the law as it applied in, say, Conley, the appropriate response might be yes, 
but that law has changed. Thus (for example), in his dissenting opinion in Twombly, Justice 
Stevens stated, “This case is a poor vehicle for the Court’s new pleading rule, for we have 
observed that ‘in antitrust cases, where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged 
conspirators,” . . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should 
be granted very sparingly.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 586–87 (2007) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (omission in original) (quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 
738, 746 (1976)). Obviously, the case cited by Justice Stevens in support of this proposition 
predates 1983. Of course, if what these critics really mean is that they liked the former law 
better (or that it was in some normative sense superior), they might again be correct, though that 
is a different argument.  
Incidentally, there has been some debate regarding the source of the Court’s choice of the 
word “plausible” in this context, and some have argued (persuasively) that it derives from 
substantive antitrust law. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible 
Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“In antitrust doctrine, the word plausible has been used to assess antitrust 
pleadings and proof in a manner that has less to do with the form of an allegation—‘procedural 
plausibility’—and, in contrast, more to do with a substantive evaluation of proof or allegation 
advanced by a claimant.”). But it might be observed that this same word also was used in 
connection with the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11. See, e.g., Note, Plausible 
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 632 (1987) 
(“[T]he 1983 amendments . . . conflict with the liberal pleading regime of the Federal Rules by 
demanding greater specificity in pleading and by discouraging the pleading of novel legal 
theories.”).  
113 It is also important to keep in mind, though, that for plaintiffs that do have sufficient 
evidence, Rule 11(b)(3) poses no impediment. In other words, it is important to recall the 
distinction between factual insufficiency and insufficiency of proof. For example, Professor 
Hoffman argues that “an allegation that is implausible may also be said to violate Rule 
11(b)(3).” Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1254 
(2008). Though this might have been true in Twombly and Iqbal, it is by no means true in many 
(if not most) other cases, cases in which a complaint might be deemed insufficient but in which 
the plaintiff possesses sufficient evidence of a claim.  
Incidentally, there is now some question as to whether Twombly and Iqbal apply to 
answers as well as complaints. Generally speaking, the answer seems to be “no,” in that the 
“showing” requirement contained in Rule 8(a)(2) does not appear in those portions of Rule 8 
relating to responsive pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)–(c). Nonetheless, Rule 8(b)(5) requires 
that “[a] party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of 
an allegation must so state . . . .” Id. 8(b)(5). Moreover, in addition to the more general 
commands of Rule 11, see supra note 109, Rule 11(b)(4) requires that “the denials of factual 
contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based 
on belief or a lack of information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4). 
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unable to satisfy the burden imposed by this rule. But we also know 
(or strongly suspect) that there are some cases, perhaps many cases, in 
which such evidence lies in the hands of others, including the 
defendant. Why does a plaintiff in this situation not simply obtain that 
evidence before commencement? That would be prudent if it were 
possible; but in many cases, it is not. The reason is that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not provide for preaction 
discovery.114 As a result, there are few opportunities for obtaining 
such evidence before filing the complaint, and even fewer means of 
compelling production of such evidence. Thus, just as Rule 11 
prevents a plaintiff from pleading a claim lacking sufficient 
evidentiary support, the inability to conduct sufficient preaction 
discovery is largely responsible for preventing some plaintiffs from 
satisfying Rule 11. 
Somewhat surprisingly, following Twombly and Iqbal, this 
inability to conduct preaction discovery has received only limited 
attention, and the impact of Rule 11 has received almost none.115 
Instead, most have accused the Supreme Court of dramatically 
changing federal pleading standards, and of “amending” Rule 8 by 
judicial decision.116 But unlike Rule 11, Rule 8 has not changed 
appreciably since its inception,117 and though reinterpretations of 
longstanding legal text are not without precedent,118 such 
reinterpretations are relatively rare, and the Court gave no indication 
that it was doing so in either Twombly or Iqbal.119 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court already has penultimate control over the content of 
the Rules,120 and it is well aware that formal amendment is the better 
way of effecting this sort of change.121 It is, therefore, simply 
                                                                                                                 
114 See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The 
Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 227 (2007) (“According 
to the prevailing understanding, [Rule 27] is not meant for investigating the facts in advance of 
drafting a complaint.”). Incidentally, unlike Rule 11, this “rule” against preaction discovery has 
remained essentially unchanged since 1938. 
115 The same is true of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions themselves, in which the Court 
says very little about either (and what it does say seems to suggest an incomplete understanding 
of the law in this area, see infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text).  
116 See supra note 6 and infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
117 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1201, at 85 (“Rule 8 has been amended only 
twice since its promulgation and those alterations were of a relatively minor nature.”). Though 
Rule 8 has been further amended since 2004, those amendments were extremely minor. 
118 See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (reinterpreting the Rules of 
Decision Act). 
119 See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1320 (“Nothing in the reasoning of either Twombly or 
Iqbal suggests that the Court has now claimed for itself the power to amend the Rules via its 
adjudicative decision making.”).  
120 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (2006) (describing the federal rulemaking process as 
between the Supreme Court and Congress).  
121 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (stating that the only process 
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implausible (pun intended) that the Court intended to do much more 
than clarify a plaintiff’s obligations in this regard and thereby 
invigorate Rule 12(b)(6) practice, however unartfully it might have 
done so. In other words, what the Court appears to have done here, in 
the pleading context, is essentially what it did more than thirty years 
ago in the summary-judgment area with Celotex, Liberty Lobby, and 
Matsushita, cases that similarly involved no rewriting of rule text.122 
But even if Twombly and Iqbal did bring about a change in federal 
pleading standards, they did so only with respect to those complaints 
suffering from insufficiency of proof. For (again), most factually 
insufficient complaints may be rendered sufficient by amendment, 
and the legally sufficient complaint did not become insufficient as a 
result of these cases.  
Of course, the foregoing discussion fails to answer the question: 
whether the Rules, and particularly Rule 11, currently set forth the 
“appropriate” pleading standard. Do they? That depends on one’s 
perspective. There are advantages to a regime in which little in the 
way of evidence would be needed before the commencement of an 
action. There would also be disadvantages. The same is true of the 
current regime. For even though the vast majority of plaintiffs are 
able to plead sufficient facts even under the constraint imposed by 
Rule 11(b)(3), some are not.  
But critics of the current regime should realize that, regardless of 
whether the limitation imposed by Rule 11(b)(3) is a good or a bad 
idea, this limitation prevents a plaintiff from properly pleading any 
claim for which evidence is lacking, regardless of how Rule 8 is 
interpreted. For example, a plaintiff that lacked evidence of a 
                                                                                                                 
 
for broadening the scope of a federal rule is by amendment and not judicial interpretation). 
Indeed, even the Court’s critics presumably would have to concede that the Supreme Court 
could not amend a rule by judicial decision, for aside from Congressional abrogation, the rules 
themselves, at least by implication, seem to provide the sole means by which amendment may 
be accomplished. 
Incidentally, a similar criticism—arguably more well founded—was directed toward the 
1983 amendments to Rule 11. See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 112, at 634 (“The 1983 
amendments to rule 11 have altered the standard for sufficient pleading. Although they do not 
explicitly change that standard, the amendments articulate a standard for avoiding sanctions that 
requires a complaint to specify legal and factual bases to a fuller extent than that necessary to 
survive a motion to dismiss.” (footnotes omitted)). 
122 This is not to say that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions did not upset some lawyers’ 
understandings regarding pleading sufficiency; as mentioned previously, it appears that they 
have. See supra note 6. But the same was true of the summary-judgment trilogy with respect to 
the law governing motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.03[1] at 56-23 to -24 (3d ed. 2010) (“Courts and 
commentators quickly perceived the trilogy as ushering in a ‘new era’ for more favorable 
judicial attitudes toward summary judgment.”). 
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defendant’s negligence could not plead “negligence,” even if that 
were all Rule 8 required.123 Thus, for those who are dissatisfied with 
the results in cases like Twombly and Iqbal, the amendment of Rule 
11, and/or greatly enhanced opportunities for preaction discovery—
and not the amendment of Rule 8, or the abrogation of (or return to) 
some Supreme Court precedent—appears to be the proper solution. 
Indeed, unless this lack-of-evidence-at-commencement “problem” is 
addressed, it is not entirely clear what else could be done. The reason, 
again, is that insufficiency of proof has a double effect. As virtually 
everyone has realized, it will prevent a plaintiff from satisfying 
anything beyond the most liberal pleading standard.124 But 
insufficiency of proof will also prevent a plaintiff from satisfying any 
pleading standard that includes sufficiency of proof as a 
prerequisite.125  
One last point regarding insufficiency of proof: some have argued 
that a plaintiff that is faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim and is unable to plead sufficient facts due to a lack of 
evidence should be permitted to conduct limited discovery (dubbed 
by some as “plausibility discovery”126) for this purpose. For example, 
                                                                                                                 
123 It is true that the defense of failure to state a claim may be waived by the defendant. But 
this does not mean that the obligations imposed by Rule 11 are optional; on the contrary, they 
appear to be quite mandatory. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. The same arguably could be said of Rule 8 
and the pleading of a claim, which is written in mandatory terms. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
124 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 5, at 474 (“[The major criticism is] that the Court 
imposed a heightened specificity standard of pleading and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence 
to plead these specifics prior to discovery.”).  
125 For example, a bill was recently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives calling 
for the enactment of a new section to title 28 of the United States Code that would provide in 
pertinent part: 
A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule  12 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not 
dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge 
that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiff’s claim to be plausible or are 
insufficient to warrant a reasonable  inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged. 
Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2078(a) (2009). Arguably, 
there are several problems with this proposal; for example, if the “no set of facts” language 
indeed relates to legal insufficiency (as this Article suggests), then it is superfluous, in that it is a 
proposition with which everyone already agrees. But more to the point, regarding the last 
sentence and its proposed treatment of the “factual contents of the complaint,” it seems that one 
does not even reach this issue unless, consistent with Rule 11, one can plead sufficient facts in 
the first instance. In other words, for plaintiffs lacking sufficient evidence, permitting plaintiffs 
to plead more generally (or in a more conclusory fashion) will not help, for a claim lacking 
evidentiary support will continue to lack evidentiary support. And the same is true, it seems, 
with most, if not all, of the alternative proposals currently being circulated. For a collection (and 
discussion) of such proposals, see Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: 
Where Do We Go from Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24 (2010). 
126 Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery 
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
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Professor Hartnett argues, “discovery can proceed prior to the filing 
of a 12(b)(6) motion and during its pendency.”127  
With all due respect to those advocating this approach, the 
argument in support of “plausibility discovery,” on balance, seems 
wanting. Most significantly, it appears fairly clear that the drafters of 
the Rules, principally through Rule 11, have already made the 
decision as to where to draw the line regarding whether and to what 
extent a plaintiff must have the evidence needed to prove its case 
before commencement. To put the matter more bluntly: Rule 11(b)(3) 
flatly contradicts the notion of “plausibility discovery.” The structure 
of the Rules generally also seems to belie this approach. The principal 
concern of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is whether a 
plaintiff should be allowed to proceed (and therefore to engage in 
such things as discovery); indeed, this defense may be asserted before 
the defendant is required to answer the complaint.128 Moreover, the 
idea of conducting discovery for the purpose of adding additional 
information to the complaint traditionally has been regarded as 
anathema to the modern pleading scheme.129 Finally, there is the 
matter of timing. Rule 26(d)(1) provides that a party generally “may 
not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred 
as required by Rule 26(f).”130 Rule 26(f)(1) provides that the parties 
generally are not required to confer as to discovery until “21 days 
before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is 
due under Rule 16(b).”131 And Rule 16(b)(2) provides that the court is 
not required to issue a scheduling order until “the earlier of 120 days 
after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days 
after any defendant has appeared.”132 Given that a responsive 
pleading (such as an answer) generally must be served by a defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 
65, 68 (2010). 
127 Hartnett, supra note 5, at 507. 
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (stating that a motion asserting any of the defenses 
enumerated in the rule must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed). 
129 See, e.g., 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1376, at 327 (“Once discovery has 
begun, there is no real value in requiring the plaintiff to go back and insert the results of that 
process in the complaint . . . .”). Though this criticism was lodged with respect to discovery 
conducted in response to a motion for a more definite statement, the same reasoning would 
seem to apply here. See id. (stating that courts’ occasional practice of granting motions for a 
more definite statement to allow the pleader the opportunity for more discovery “is a dubious 
procedure” and has little value). Following discovery, a plaintiff might amend its complaint to 
add a claim (or perhaps even to delete a claim), but not, ordinarily, to bolster a claim it has 
already attempted to plead.  
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1). 
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2). 
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within twenty-one days of being served with process,133 and that a 
preanswer motion to dismiss “must be made before pleading if a 
responsive pleading is allowed,”134 the Rules obviously contemplate 
that discovery generally should not proceed until after any preanswer 
motions to dismiss are resolved.135 In any event, for some or all of 
these reasons, the Iqbal Court (though perhaps in dicta) rejected this 
possibility.136  
This does not mean, of course, that “plausibility discovery” is 
completely unattractive as a normative matter, and that the rules 
governing discovery could not be amended to provide for this 
possibility; they could. But such rules would be in tension (to put it 
mildly) with Rule 11, and would run up against the policy concerns 
                                                                                                                 
133 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).  
134 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(i) (“If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–
(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion [for judgment on the pleadings] 
must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.”). Though 
Rule 12(i) does not say how far before trial such motions must be heard and decided, there is a 
very strong presumption that they be resolved promptly. For example, it would make little 
sense—indeed, it would be unfair—to compel a defendant to engage in extensive discovery as 
to the merits in an action where jurisdiction is lacking. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(c)(1) (generally 
permitting the service of a motion and notice of hearing in as few as fourteen days before the 
date of the hearing). Though Rule 12(i) further provides for the possibility of a deferred ruling 
on such motions, such a deferral is exceptional, and presumably would be granted only in those 
rare situations in which the defense is inextricably intertwined with the merits—something that 
does not occur in the failure to state a claim context. Thus, even proponents of “plausibility 
discovery,” who are only seeking a deferral until the completion of such discovery, would 
probably concede that a deferral until trial is inappropriate.  
136 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Because respondent’s complaint 
is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”); see also Robert 
G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 882–83 (2010) (“To be sure, investigation through discovery can 
reveal useful information, but investigation is not in itself the purpose of adjudication. That 
purpose is to furnish remedies for substantive law violations.”); McMahon, supra note 4, at 866 
(“The Second Circuit’s casual suggestion that a district court might wish to order some 
discovery before considering a motion addressed to a pleading fundamentally misconceives the 
nature of the demurrer and undermines the procedural jurisprudence of Rule 12(b)(6) motions—
jurisprudence that was as well settled as the ‘no set of facts’ rule until Twombly.”); Lisa 
Pondrom, Comment, Predicting the Unpredictable Under Rule 11(b)(3): When Are Allegations 
“Likely” to Have Evidentiary Support?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996) (“Discovery plays 
a central role in contemporary federal civil procedure. But under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a pleader gains access to discovery only if a valid complaint is on file with the 
court.”).  
The argument against “plausibility discovery” also seems to apply to other efforts to 
circumvent Rule 11. For example, Judge McMahon argues: 
[T]here are claims where important factual information is particularly within the control of 
the defendant. This makes it harder for the plaintiff to allege enough facts to meet the 
plausibility standard. To assess the issue of “plausibility” in such cases, it is probably useful for 
district judges to invoke Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules, which states, “Pleadings must be 
construed so as to do justice.”  
McMahon, supra note 4, at 867 (footnotes omitted). But it is one thing to construe a 
pleading so as to do justice; it is quite another to permit discovery in the name of justice when 
the Rules provide to the contrary. 
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identified by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal. Again, a more systemic 
overhaul probably would be required. 
III. TWO LOOSE ENDS 
Before concluding, this Article will now turn to two areas of 
special concern, particularly following Twombly and Iqbal: the proper 
treatment of frivolous complaints, and the possible disparity between 
federal and state pleading standards and the conflicting results that 
might be produced under each. 
A. Frivolous Complaints 
The first area of concern relates to the frivolous complaint, more 
specifically the “factually frivolous” complaint (i.e., a complaint that 
consists of allegations “sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we 
know it”).137 To use Justice Souter’s example in Iqbal, what if a 
plaintiff were to allege claims “about little green men, or the 
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel”?138 If the 
defendant in such an action were to move to dismiss the action for 
failure to state a claim, what should be the result? Should the motion 
be granted? 
Most lawyers—as well as most judges—would probably say 
“yes.”139 But though few would disagree with that result—after all, 
everyday experience suggests that such allegations are absurd and 
patently false—such a ruling arguably would be incorrect. The 
primary reason relates (again) to the principle that at this stage in the 
proceedings, the plaintiff’s allegations must be assumed to be true.140 
And if the allegations in Justice Souter’s hypothetical complaint are 
true, the plaintiff might well have stated a valid claim.141 Another 
problem with such an interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) is that it lends 
                                                                                                                 
137 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). Such a complaint might be roughly 
distinguished from the legally frivolous complaint, which consists of allegations that are true, 
but that neither states a recognized claim nor is backed by a “nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
11(b)(2).  
138 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). Those who have dealt with pro se 
complaints will recognize that such hypotheticals are not so hypothetical. 
139 Indeed, Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in Iqbal, implied as much, see id. 
(discussing the “sole exception” to the standard that a court shall take the alleged facts as true), 
and no other Justice took issue with that conclusion. 
140 See, e.g., id. at 1951 (opinion of the Court) (“To be clear, we do not reject [the 
plaintiff’s] bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.”); see also 
supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
141 And in any event, how are we to know? Maybe the plaintiff did go to Pluto; it is going 
to be true some day. And let us not forget that truth very often is stranger than fiction. For 
example, how many of us foresaw the Court’s holding in Twombly, let alone Iqbal? 
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credence to the notion that the word “plausibility” as used by the 
Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal means (essentially) 
believability. But the issue at this stage in the proceedings is not 
whether a court “believes” that a claim has been stated; rather, the 
issue is whether a claim has been stated. The credibility of the 
plaintiff is simply not relevant. Under Rule 12(b)(6), therefore, a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim seemingly must be 
denied, for the underlying complaint could not be regarded as 
deficient, assuming it included sufficient detail and otherwise stated a 
legally sufficient claim. As the Supreme Court explained in a 
somewhat different context: 
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the 
basis of a dispositive issue of law. . . . What Rule 12(b)(6) 
does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge’s 
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. District court 
judges looking to dismiss claims on such grounds must look 
elsewhere for legal support.142 
Does this mean, then, that there is nothing a court may do with such a 
complaint? Must such a plaintiff be allowed to proceed? No. But 
rather than a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it seems that the 
better procedure would be a motion for sanctions under Rule 11. A 
motion for sanctions under Rule 11 may be initiated either by a party 
or by the court itself,143 and the possible nonmonetary penalties for 
violation of this rule include the dismissal of the action.144 Such a 
proceeding would provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to prove 
the seemingly impossible, though without the assumption as to the 
truthfulness of its allegations as provided under Rule 12(b)(6).145 The 
                                                                                                                 
142 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989).  
The same would also seem to be true with respect to a plaintiff that relies on the second 
part of Rule 11(b)(3)—that certain “factual contentions” alleged in the complaint, “if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Just as a court (at least for Rule 
12(b)(6) purposes) must accept as true a plaintiff’s nonconclusory allegations generally, it seems 
that it also must accept as true any allegations as to which evidentiary support is not yet in the 
possession of the plaintiff, but is likely to be in the future. Moreover, it also seems that the 
invocation of this portion of Rule 11(b)(3) should insulate a plaintiff from the argument that its 
complaint is factually insufficient; of course it is, for the very reason that the plaintiff is not yet 
in possession of anything more specific. Any other interpretation of Rule 11(b)(3) would 
effectively prevent a plaintiff from utilizing this procedure. 
143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)–(3) (addressing the initiation of sanctions by motion or the 
court’s initiative). 
144 See, e.g., 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 488, ¶ 11.24[2], at 11-67 (discussing the 
dismissal of an action as a severe sanction). 
145 In other words, though a plaintiff’s nonconclusory allegations must be taken as true for 
purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), they need not be taken as true if challenged under Rule 11 
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result would be the same—the action would be dismissed—though 
without the theoretical difficulties posed by a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim.146  
To summarize: the appropriate standard for determining whether a 
plaintiff has adequately stated a claim—frivolous or not—is 
sufficiency, not believability. The insufficient complaint may be 
attacked pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); the unbelievable complaint may 
not. But the unbelievable complaint may be attacked pursuant to Rule 
11, though not for unbelievability per se, but rather for lack of 
evidentiary support.147 Neither the insufficient nor the frivolous 
complaint should be allowed to proceed. But they are different 
subsets of a larger universe. Not all frivolous complaints are 
insufficient, at least not in the Rule 12(b)(6) sense, just as not all 
insufficient complaints are frivolous. Of course, in either situation, 
the defendant challenging the complaint in question had better be 
correct (or, more accurately, must himself comply with the 
requirements imposed by Rule 11), for a baseless motion by a 
defendant in either context should not only be denied, but should 
subject that party to sanctions as well. 
                                                                                                                 
 
(understanding that the defendant presumably would have the burden of proving otherwise). See 
Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 112, at 635 (“Rule 11 authorizes sanctions for claims that 
are not ‘grounded in fact.’ This provision is important because pretrial motions under other rules 
might fail to screen out such claims. Courts deciding motions to dismiss under rule 12 must 
assume that all facts alleged are true.” (footnotes omitted)) . 
146 Tobias Wolff makes a somewhat similar argument, albeit not in the frivolous context. 
See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 317 (2009) (statement of Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (discussing the application of Rule 
11(b)(3) to test the evidentiary support of plaintiff’s allegations). 
Incidentally, it might be observed that a district court might still get it wrong in this 
context, in that a plaintiff might tell a ridiculously fantastic story that is actually true. Subatomic 
physics (among other subjects) provides several examples. But this sort of error unfortunately 
inures in adjudication generally; it is tolerated because it is ultimately unavoidable. 
147 Thus, for example, Professor Steinman is mostly correct when he writes that “[t]he 
inquiry [at the pleading stage] is not whether the plaintiff has or was likely to uncover evidence 
to support the allegations in the complaint.” Steinman, supra note 3, at 1301 (emphasis 
omitted). This is true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), but it is not true with respect to Rule 11. 
Similarly, Professor Steinman writes that “a summary judgment motion is the device for testing 
pretrial whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to support its claims.” Id. at 1330; accord 
Hoffman, supra note 113, at 1254 (“Rule 11 is a certification and sanctioning rule and not 
normally the vehicle for dismissing insufficient claims. That is what Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 
are for.”). Again, this seems to be true, but only in part. A motion for summary judgment is the 
proper procedure for determining whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact,” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); a motion for sanctions is the proper procedure for determining whether 
the plaintiff’s allegations “have evidentiary support,” id. 11(b)(3). Of course, Professor 
Steinman is quite correct that a plaintiff that pleads claims that lack evidentiary support—and 
gains nothing in discovery—also would be vulnerable at summary judgment, just as it would be 
at trial. But that is of little solace to the defendant hoping to avoid needless expense.  
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Regrettably, not only did the Twombly and Iqbal Courts fail to 
make this distinction, but it is also not entirely clear that they 
appreciated it. For example, in Twombly, the Court stated, “Asking 
for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a 
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for 
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”148 But under Rule 11(b)(3), a 
plaintiff’s “factual contentions” (unless qualified in the manner 
specified in that rule) are required to have evidentiary support when 
pleaded.149 Because of this misunderstanding, one almost gets the 
sense that the Court’s plausibility standard, perhaps inadvertently, is 
intended to serve as a sort of proxy for a plaintiff’s obligations under 
Rule 11. Consider, again, Twombly: the essential problem for the 
plaintiffs in that case was that they had no specific evidence of any 
agreement by the defendants to restrain trade. But rather than sanction 
the plaintiffs for violating their obligation under Rule 11(b)(3), the 
Court imposed a pleading standard that, for the very same reason—
lack of evidence—the plaintiffs could not meet. The same appears to 
be true in Iqbal, wherein the Court stated, “respondent’s complaint 
does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest 
petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”150 The Iqbal Court actually 
seemed to be saying that it doubted the plaintiff had any specific 
evidence as to these defendants’ state of mind.151 
Does this mean, then, that Rule 11 plays as significant a role in 
actions such as Twombly and Iqbal as it does in frivolous actions? It 
seems that it must, and the reason relates to the quantum of proof 
required under that rule. Rule 11(b)(3) generally requires that a 
                                                                                                                 
148 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007). 
149 There are several other examples. For instance, in Twombly, the Court noted “the 
unobjectionable proposition that, when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be 
dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary 
support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.” Id. at 564 n.8 
(emphasis added). Again, this might be true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim (and related proceedings), but not for purposes of Rule 11. Similarly, Justice 
Stevens in dissent stated, “This case is a poor vehicle for the Court’s new pleading rule, for we 
have observed that ‘in antitrust cases, where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged 
conspirators,” . . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should 
be granted very sparingly.’” Id. at 586–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (omission in original) 
(quoting Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)). But as discussed 
previously, Rule 11 generally proscribes the allegation of all claims lacking evidentiary support, 
including those where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,” id., and 
regardless of what discovery (if it were allowed) might reveal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
150 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009). 
151 Benjamin Spencer advances a somewhat similar argument. See A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 192–97 
(2010) (discussing the Iqbal court’s skepticism towards factual allegations and its effect on the 
assumption-of-truth rule). 
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plaintiff’s factual contentions have “evidentiary support.” What does 
that mean? It cannot mean any evidentiary support, for the 
uncorroborated (and fantastic) testimony of a mentally ill individual 
cannot be regarded as sufficient; if it were, there would be no basis 
for dismissing even the factually frivolous complaint. That cannot be 
correct. But the same also must be true of seemingly nonfrivolous 
actions like Reid. If a plaintiff’s evidence is such that the plaintiff 
cannot possibly win at trial, such evidence is every bit as insufficient 
as evidence of time travel.  
So how much more evidentiary support is needed? It seems, once 
again, that the standard must be sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable juror could find or infer sufficient facts to find in favor of 
the plaintiff. No lesser standard makes sense, particularly given the 
fallback provision, which alternatively allows a plaintiff to allege (if 
true) that its factual contentions “will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery.”152  
Of course, the fact that the Court might have failed to appreciate 
the import of Rule 11 does not necessarily mean that the Court’s 
interpretation of Rule 8 was incorrect, or that the “showing” required 
under that rule does not also serve some other purpose. But the 
imposition of a more stringent pleading standard than that required 
under Rule 8, if that (as many believe) is what the Court has done,153 
seems like a poor way of addressing the problems caused by an 
insufficiency of proof. As Professors Clermont and Yeazell cogently 
observe, “Rule 11 now punishes those who make allegations without 
an evidentiary basis for doing so; indeed, one could have less 
disruptively attained an equivalent of the Twombly and Iqbal regime 
by aggressively rereading Rule 11 rather than Rule 8.”154 The 
Twombly Court’s concerns regarding the high cost of discovery and 
the possibility of extorted settlements, though dubious as 
justifications for reinterpreting Rule 8, were precisely the concerns of 
the drafters of the amendments to Rule 11. But few seem interested in 
pursuing Rule 11 to its logical conclusion.155 Instead, most courts and 
                                                                                                                 
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
153 See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 474 (“Scholarly reaction to Twombly has been largely 
critical, with most complaining that the Court imposed a heightened specificity standard of 
pleading and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence to plead these specifics prior to discovery.”). 
154 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 6, at 849 (footnotes omitted). 
155 For example, if plaintiffs truly had evidentiary support for their claims at 
commencement (and defendants truly had evidentiary support for their denials), there would be 
little need for summary judgment, as any such motion (at least to the extent it turned on the 
evidence) would have to be denied. 
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commentators seem almost oblivious to its terms, or at least have 
exhibited some degree of willful blindness to its obligations. 
B. The Divergence of Federal and State Pleading Standards 
Another problem, brought to the fore following Twombly and 
Iqbal, relates to the divergence (or potential divergence) of federal 
and state pleading standards. Many states have pleading rules similar 
to Rule 8.156 Many of these purportedly rely on the portion of Conley 
that was repudiated in Twombly.157 Moreover, many states do not 
have anything similar to Rule 11(b)(3). And even if they did, any 
such rule could be amended at any time.158 Of course, the fact that 
federal and state procedural rules might be different is not, of itself, a 
serious problem; though it might be more convenient if they were the 
same, there are very few legal requirements along this line. But a 
difficulty potentially arises due to the fact that a dismissal for failure 
to state a claim is generally regarded as being “on the merits” or “with 
prejudice”—i.e., it precludes the assertion of the same claim in a later 
action, just as surely as an adverse decision on a motion for summary 
judgment or at trial.159 The problem is that a complaint might be 
found deficient in a federal court, yet if filed in a state court and 
tested under state procedural rules, might survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 
Some have argued that this potential disparity in treatment creates 
a problem under Erie, such that a federal court in a diversity action 
might be required to adopt certain state pleading standards. But such 
an argument seems untenable, for if Hanna v. Plumer160 still means 
anything, the fact that federal and state laws might seem to conflict in 
this area raises no such issue.161 Still, this potential disparity in 
                                                                                                                 
156 For a survey of the extent to which states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (with a particular emphasis on pleading rules), see John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, 
The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 
WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986). For a more recent survey (that also includes a consideration of the 
1983 and 1993 changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, see John B. Oakley, A Fresh 
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003) [hereinafter Oakley, A Fresh 
Look]. 
157 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Taking their cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as 
their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority repudiates . . . .”). 
158 See Oakley, A Fresh Look, supra note 1566, at 355 (“While the federal model of civil 
procedure remains substantially influential at the state level, it is no longer true that many state 
systems of civil procedure replicate the federal model.”). 
159 See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (stating 
that the dismissal of an action under Rule 12(b)(6) constitutes a judgment on the merits). 
160 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
161 One leading treatise concludes: 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanna v. Plumer, it no longer can be doubted that 
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treatment seems troubling. Short of rules unification, is there any 
solution to this problem? 
Perhaps. To the extent that state pleading rules are more liberal 
than the federal rules, one might expect some plaintiffs that 
previously might have commenced their actions in federal court to 
commence their actions in a state court. This is not a complete 
solution, though, for subject-matter jurisdiction of some actions lies 
exclusively in the federal district courts,162 and to the extent 
jurisdiction is concurrent, removal by defendants to a federal district 
court likely remains an option.163  
But even as to those actions adjudicated in federal court, a plaintiff 
that is dismissed for failure to state a claim might find some relief. 
The answer, if there is one, lies in the reasons why dismissals for 
failure to state claim traditionally have been given claim-preclusive 
effect. Legal insufficiency presents the easiest example. If an action is 
dismissed for legal insufficiency, dismissal with prejudice seems 
appropriate, for both federal and state courts should reach the same 
result. There is no reason to give such a plaintiff a second chance. The 
same appears to be true with respect to factual insufficiency, though 
the reasoning here is somewhat more difficult. Given the liberality of 
the federal rules governing amended pleadings, in most actions, only 
the most obstinate plaintiffs will fail to comply with the court’s 
demands.164 Though a state court might have a less demanding 
pleading standard, the “federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
the rules regarding the standard of specificity to be applied to federal pleadings, . . . the special 
requirements for pleading certain matters, the allocation of the burden of pleading among the 
parties, and the signing of pleadings by an attorney of record or an unrepresented party, all are 
governed by the federal rules and not by the practice of the courts in the state in which the 
federal court happens to be sitting. 
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 1204, at 104–05 (footnote omitted); see also Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (reconfirming that 
applicable and valid federal rules apply in federal court). For somewhat similar reasons, there 
also appears to be no reverse-Erie problem, nor a problem under the Seventh Amendment. See, 
e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (“In numerous 
contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent submission of claims to a jury’s judgment 
without violating the Seventh Amendment.”).  
162 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006) (“Admiralty, maritime, and prize cases”). 
163 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (“Actions removable generally”). In order to avoid removal, 
Georgene Vairo argues that such plaintiffs will attempt to “craft their complaints to make them 
removal-proof.” Georgene Vairo, Will Iqbal Case Play a Role in Forum Selection?, NAT’L L.J., 
Jan. 25, 2010, at 18. There are limits, though, to the extent to which plaintiffs realistically can 
do so.  
164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. d (1982) (“Such a result is 
warranted by the ease with which pleadings may be amended . . . and by the unfairness of 
requiring the defendant to submit to a second action . . . when no such amendment is sought, or 
when no appeal has been taken from an erroneous denial of leave to amend.”). 
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own processes” also might justify according claim-preclusive effect 
to such a dismissal.165  
But what about a dismissal for failure to state a claim based on 
factual insufficiency where the inability to plead sufficient facts is 
caused by an insufficiency of proof, that is, by the strictures imposed 
by Rule 11(b)(3), such as occurred in Twombly and perhaps in Iqbal? 
Should such a dismissal be granted with prejudice if a state-court 
plaintiff would not be so constrained? Arguably not; rather, such a 
disparity in the rules seemingly should be regarded as a matter of 
policy imposed by the federal courts that need not be imposed on any 
other system. Accordingly, such a dismissal might be regarded as 
binding on other federal courts—for surely it should be given 
preclusive effect across all federal district courts—but not necessarily 
binding on a state court with more liberal pleading requirements. It 
might be treated, in other words, as more of a technical requirement, 
and one that does not necessarily go to the merits of a plaintiff’s 
claim. For under these circumstances, the federal district court would 
be deciding only that the plaintiff was unable to plead sufficient 
facts—and even then, only because it then lacked supporting 
evidence.166 The court would not be deciding that, even if given the 
opportunity to conduct discovery, the plaintiff has no case, or that the 
plaintiff has willfully failed to comply with the court’s demands.167 
One might also consider this problem from the perspective of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, the rule governing dismissals 
generally. Under Rule 41, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss its 
action by notice if it does so “before the opposing party serves either 
an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”168 This means that a 
voluntary dismissal remains an option after the filing of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. But a plaintiff in the typical factual 
or legal insufficiency situation is unlikely to avail itself of this 
procedure, as in either situation, a voluntary dismissal would be 
pointless. If the problem is factual insufficiency, it almost certainly 
                                                                                                                 
165 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001). 
166 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (generally denying claim-
preclusive effect to judgments that rest “on the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff’s 
failure to satisfy a precondition to suit”). Perhaps one might also consider that when the defense 
of failure to state a claim is asserted postpleading, the reason usually is either legal insufficiency 
or (more likely) that the plaintiff, even postdiscovery, has insufficient supporting evidence. 
Whether the complaint was factually sufficient or the plaintiff’s claims had sufficient 
evidentiary support at commencement is typically regarded as irrelevant.  
167 Of course, a complaint utterly lacking in evidentiary support could subject the plaintiff 
to a dismissal pursuant to Rule 11, and presumably such a dismissal could be made with 
prejudice as to all courts. But a less egregious violation of Rule 11 presumably would call for a 
less serious sanction. Similar reasoning seemingly should apply in the Rule 12(b)(6) context. 
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 
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could be cured within the confines of the current action, whereas if 
the problem is legal insufficiency, it would be incurable. By contrast, 
if the problem is insufficiency of proof, a plaintiff might well avail 
itself of this procedure, for such a dismissal generally is without 
prejudice,169 and the plaintiff (again) might well fare better in a state 
court. And if such a plaintiff may avoid the claim-preclusive effect of 
a dismissal for failure to state a claim merely by voluntarily 
dismissing its action, it arguably makes little sense to give a dismissal 
for failure to state a claim such an effect in essentially the same 
procedural context.170 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At bottom, current federal civil pleading practice has more to do 
with the limited opportunities for investigation before commencement 
and the obligation to have evidentiary support for one’s allegations 
and less to do with pleading standards. Unless and until there are 
changes to the former, little can be done with the latter. 
In the meantime, it would probably be better if concerns regarding 
the strength of a plaintiff’s evidence were resolved through Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, rather than Rule 8 and a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” should contain enough 
information to serve its limited purposes, but no more. 
Renewed consideration also should be given to the proper 
preclusive effect of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
In particular, when a dismissal is based solely on a plaintiff’s inability 
to plead sufficient facts due to a lack of supporting evidence, perhaps 
the dismissal should not be given claim-preclusive effect, for in that 
situation there has been no constructive adjudication of the underlying 
merits, nor does there appear to be any significant federal policy 
justifying this result. 
                                                                                                                 
169 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B). 
170 Of course, if a federal district court had subject-matter jurisdiction of the first action, a 
subsequent state-court action probably (though not certainly) could be removed to the same or 
another federal district court. This might seem to expose a plaintiff to a series of dismissals, 
state-court filings, and removals (at least until the applicable statute of limitations expires). But 
Rule 11, by its terms, is inapplicable to papers filed in state court. See JOSEPH, supra note 112, 
§ 5(A)(2), at 2-22 to -23 (“Rule 11 does not apply to . . . pleadings, written motions or other 
papers served or filed in a state court action . . . .”). Thus, it is at least arguable that a state-court 
complaint that was sufficient when filed would remain sufficient following removal, even if 
insufficient if filed in federal court. 
